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Industrial history is necessarily concerned with economic growth and decline. Lancashire
Cotton  textiles provides a classic case study of these processes. From being the vanguard 
sector of the industrial revolution in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the 
industry  fell into rapid and terminal decline in the twentieth. Determinants of growth and 
decline,  such as industry structure, profitability, capital accumulation and technological 
choice   have been addressed in previous studies, although certain variables have enjoye  d
more attention than others.1 The period 1870-1914 has been regarded by some as a time 
when Lancashire entrepreneurs made the mistakes that condemned the industry to its 
subsequent   downfall. In particular, they have sought to establish links between industrial 
organisation and economic decline. As a result, debates on the poor performance of 
Lancashire cotton xtiles have been somewhat dominated by the issues of technology te
and organisation.2 
A mythology has thereby developed based on the ostensibly old fashioned attitudes 
of Lancashire entrepreneurs and commonly believed interpretations concerning incorrect 
investment decisions, poor leadership and inappropriate industry structure. Accordingly  ,
the evidence below is examined considering the arguments that have dominated typical 
discussions of Lancashire textiles. Mostly these have concerned choice of technique, 
primarily between ring and mule spinning.3 The first is that Lancashire entrepreneurs 
did not replace mule spindles and power looms with ring spindles and automatic looms 
to the extent they should.4 Second, that ring spindles from a relatively early date were 
more efficient than mules, especially regarding labour cost.5 Third, and following on from 
the first two, that industry structure was an important influence on these investment 
choices.6 Each of these points will be examined in more detail below. An additional 
point of reference, hitherto neglected entirely, will be the strategies and profitability of 
specific companies differentiated by their investment policies. 
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The business history of Lancashire textiles has thus far not been informed by evidence 
from financial and accounting sources. Yet such evidence is of relevance to the major 
areas of discussion and controversy, such as encrepreneurship, technology and structure, 
and world markers, dealt with by previous histories. Recent work has used this new 
evidence to re-examine the strategies of Lancashire entrepreneurs and the business 
networks that facilitated their operation before i9i4.7 The debates concerning technol- 
ogy, structure and world markets are also important in the light of new evidence and 
the present purpose is to reconsider these issues. 
Accounting records, capital market data, and business archives for a sample of cotton 
companies, form the main body of evidence for this re-examination. (For a list of principal 
source material, see appendix i.) Financial performance, growth and financial policy 
are the three broad aspects of business strategy examined. The first is measured by 
profitability, taken as return on capital employed (ROCE), defined as profit before interest 
as a percentage of long term capital invested. Growth is measured by accumulation of 
equity capital employed and financial policy refers to principal sources of debt and equity 
finance for investment, together with the extent of divestment by capital repayments 
and dividends. The sample is segmented by ownership, vertical structure and choice of 
technology. 
The discussion below uses a political economy framework 8 to examine the development 
of the cotton economy of Lancashire. Within this framework, the use of accounting and 
financial data facilitates an examination of the shareholder and manager governance 
relationship, and the impact of profits and wealth changes in one period and growth and 
investment in the next. Political economic analysis also moderates some of the difficulties 
of following an accounting based method, for example the presupposition of capital 
market efficiency.9 Publications of accounting numbers are treated as historical events 
and form a body of empirical evidence for judging the behaviour and response of 
entrepreneurs and investors. Accounting techniques may have been relatively primitive, 
but the purpose here is to examine what was reported under historical conditions, rather 
than what would have been reported under modern conditions. 
None of the evidence considered to date has included any case studies of the experience 
of actual companies, nor reference to the profitability of those companies that shifted to 
the less familiar technology. To what extent, therefore, were Lancashire entrepreneurs 
genuinely reticent in experimenting with ring spinning and the automatic loom, and if 
so why7 Was any such reticence justified, and if so, did it ultimately cost the industry 
its world leadership? To address these questions, the actual experiences of Lancashire 
companies are examined. The analysis is divided into four sections, which link previous 
explanations with a framework for empirical evidence introduced by this research. First, 
the special characteristics of Lancashire entrepreneurship are defined. Then the diffusion 
of alternative technologies is examined and examples of companies are identified that 
sought to specialise in ring spinning or experiment with automatic looms, in some cases 
from a relatively early date. The diffusion pattern is then explained by reference to the 
financial performance and factor cost structures of companies pursuing different capital 
investment policies. The causes and consequences of Lancashire's specialised industry 
structure are then reassessed. Finally, conclusions are drawn and the implications for our 
understanding of the process of industrial growth and decline are examined. 
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II 
During the late nineteenth century important changes occurred in the social nature of 
Lancashire capitalism. As the industry moved from growth to maturity, wealth became 
increasingly concentrated. Unlike other industries, this did not result in monopoly, 
carrelisation, concentration and the emergence of large managerial hierarchies. Although 
it is true that some large firms were formed, they failed to dominate the industry.10 W at h
makes Lancashire a fascinating case in the period 1890-1914 is that increasing wealth 
concentration among individual owners accompanied increasing specialisation in industry 
structure. 
The process of capital accumulation underpinned the emergence of family and local 
commercial elites. Growth of reinvested equity capital was highest where private or fam ly i
control was exercised, for example at Horrocks Crewdson,11 and for the small minorit  y
of companies that raised finance beyond local Lancashire capital markets. Conversely, 
companies dependent on regional stock markets tended to reduce in size through capital 
repayments and dividend distributions.12 Dramatic increases in capital in the period 
1896-1914, exemplified by the rise of capitalists such as John Bunting (1839-1923  and )
William Birtwistle (1855-1936), accrued to individuals rather than corporations.13 
Bunting typified the Oldham based entrepreneur, using public company flotations as the 
basis of multiple directorships (Frank Platt, 1890-1955, subsequently managing director 
of the Lancashire Cotton Corporation (LCC), was a later example),1'1 whereas Birtwistle 
relied on the closely controlled private company.15 In all cases, profits were divested fro  m
established businesses for reinvestment through personal flotation or acquisition of other 
concerns.16 Crucially, these funds were channelled through the estates of proprietary 
capitalists. Strategy formulation remained the exclusive remit of these individuals. Mean  -
while, managers fulfilled a limited stewardship function designed to ensure surplus cash 
flow was remitted to the owner as soon as possible.17 Managers functioned merely at plant 
level and were subjected to interference, close scrutiny and sometimes dismissal by 
owner-entrepreneurs such as Birtwistle and Edward Fielden (185 7-1942).! 8 They were 
trusted with routine mill management and supervised only a small hierarchy. For quoted 
companies in the Oldham district, the pattern was similar, except that shareholder mistrust 
of management reflected the traditions of shareholder activism associated with workin  g
and middle class investment in the i86os and i87os. A series of slumps in share values 
undermined this ownership structure. In the period 1892-5 an index of representative 
companies declined almost continuously for 48 months.19 In length, this bear market 
amounted to a local equivalent of the Wall Street Crash. Companies relied on partly paid 
shares and had to make fresh calls to stay in business.20 Rather than meet these, workin  g
and middle class investors chose to sell, accentuating price falls further. By 1896, when 
the market finally turned, wealthier investors who had bought cheaply made significant 
gains.21 Thus, capital ownership centralised around cliques of richer shareholders able to 
exclude residual shareholders and to impose tighter control on nominee managers.22 Many 
were skilled at speculation and company flotation. Much borrowing capacity remained 
unused, whilst lines of credit increased with the social standing of individual proprietors,23 
confidence in which increased as share values recovered. By the i90os 'empires of 
individually controlled mills', on the lines suggested above, whose proprietors possessed 
ready access to financial resources, became more clearly established.24 
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To some extent, Lancashire's development was regionally distinct and remained sep- 
arate from the rest of the British economy. The stock market crash of the 1890s came 
at a time when London industrials moved ahead.25 Whilst Lancashire exports suffered 
under high gold prices, London was helped by rising demand in the domestic mar- 
ket.26 Typically, money was raised locally from the accumulated profits and divestments 
from other cotton concerns and rarely from the banks, even for working capital.27 
Although corporate independence from banks occurred in other sectors, the combined 
effect was an absence of demand and investment opportunities for capital from outside 
the county, thereby continuing a divide that had emerged from the time of industriali- 
sation.28 Increasing independence of financial capitalists further underpinned the special 
characteristics of Lancashire entrepreneurship. 
These governance mechanisms to an extent confirm an important case of British 
'personal capitalism'.29 However they are also suggestive of a gap in existing interpretations 
of Lancashire entrepreneurship. In particular, their encapsulation of separate roles for 
entrepreneurs and managers raises the crucial question of the extent to which these 
individuals contributed to the decline of the industry, for example their inability to invest 
in new technology.30 Sandberg argued that decision makers responded rationally to profit 
signals31 and loyalty to the mule was justified by its apparent superiority on counts above 
40s.32 In response, Lazonick argued that entrepreneurship was too narrowly defined, 
allowing cotton managers to be adjudged successful by reference to their ability to produce 
a rational or optimal solution given certain constraints. Had entrepreneurs been defined 
in the Schumpeterian sense, they would have been judged by their ability to remove 
constraints, for example by vertically integrating as a precursor to introducing ring 
spinning.33 As it was, 'vertical specialisation ... constrained the adoption of modern 
capital intensive technologies in the ... two decades or so prior to World War I'.34 Those 
feeling the constraints the most closely were managers and production technologists, 
especially those working in the 1920S and 1930s, and their views were quoted extensively 
by Lazonick as evidence of barriers to such capital intensive production imposed by 
vertical specialisation.35 But these individuals were excluded from decisions on industry 
organisation by the governance structure described above. The power to restructure the 
industry and to invest in new technology rested with entrepreneurs; the individual and 
financial capitalists whose adeptness lay in mobilising financial resources and mill flota- 
tion. Any constraint on adoption of more capital intensive production lay in the 
ownership of capital rather than industry structure ex ante. Despite attempts to shift the 
focus to industrial organisation, entrepreneurial attitudes towards technology remain a 
highly relevant theme and are explored further through case studies of individual com- 
panies in the next section. 
Ill 
The first known Lancashire factory dedicated to ring spinning was the New Ladyhouse 
Cotton Spinning Co. Ltd, registered on 26 April 1877.36 There followed, in the early 
i88os, a group of three companies formed around the original New Ladyhouse Company 
that became known as the 'Milnrow Ring Spinners'.37 These small, but highly significant 
firms, operated in a geographically concentrated cluster, and like the examples referred 
to earlier, were promoted and owned by the same dominant shareholder group.38 Figure 1 
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the ring spinners were less risky.40 Given the clear and acknowledged41 premium to ring 
spinning, it is surprising that the Milnrow companies were not expanded further in 
spindleage or capacity and that these early concerns were not more widely emulated in 
later decades before 1914. 
Partly the explanation lies in the inadequacy of the local capital market as a signalling 
and capital allocation device. Of particular importance was the obsession in Oldham and 
nearby towns with dividends.42 According to modern finance theory, where a capital 
market is efficient, the investor should be indifferent to the proportion of total return 
received in dividends or capital gains.43 To an extent, therefore, the dividend obsession 
must have reflected a degree of market inefficiency. Preferences for immediate cash 
instead of future capital growth indicated the distrust of managers discussed earlier, and 
was rational in the sense that it minimised monitoring costs. Also there was a lack of 
confidence in a relatively thin market,44 especially in periods such as 1892-5, when 
difficulties and cost of finding buyers for shares to liquidate investments became a problem 
for some classes of investor. Specific shareholdings rather than portfolio based investment, 
and the dominance of 'voice' over 'exit' 45 in most trading conditions fuelled the demand 
for dividends and prevented the expansion of even the most profitable concerns. Further- 
more, the maximisation of dividends, rather than shareholder wealth, cannot have 
enhanced the allocative efficiency of the market. 
Investment decisions were also influenced by entrepreneurial perceptions of risk.46 In 
the i89os, as the coarse trade suffered significant losses in the Indian market, gloom 
enveloped the industry, with many regarding its prospects with great pessimism.47 Re- 
sulting depression of share values and capital concentration reduced the capital market's 
operational efficiency and undermined its ability to allocate capital according to rational 
financial signals in the mill building boom of 1904-7.48 Meanwhile, whilst the depression 
lasted, very few new mills of any kind were built in the i89os, and the diffusion of the 
ring was undoubtedly slowed by the dampening of expectations. Indeed, little investment 
of any sort took place, particularly in the depression hit Oldham of the i89os, and this 
may be one reason for Oldham's notable commitment to the mule. Mule spindleage in 
the area declined from 11.4 to 10.9 million spindles between 1891 and 1897.49 Few other 
significant ring mill constructions occurred before the early i90os, notable exceptions 
being the Palm (1884), specialising in strong rope yarns, the Nile (1898) in Oldham, 
Bums Ring Spinning Co. Ltd at Heywood (1891) and the Era (1898) in Rochdale.50 
In many cases capital equipment manufacturers were closely involved with the pro- 
motion of new mills. For example, the Milnrow companies and the Era Mill were backed 
by Howard and Bullough Ltd, whose ring frame was an important addition to its product 
range, and the Burns company by Samuel Brooks Ltd.51 In the i90os the Draper Cor- 
poration backed British Northrop Loom Company, in liaison with the Greg, Toocal 
Broadhurst, and the Hollins family entrepreneurial group fostered similar local experi- 
ments in automatic weaving.52 The backing of such suppliers was common and may have 
helped underwrite risk, but also reflected interlocked business networks and was thus 
vital to the diffusion process.53 
Another reason for limited diffusion was the association of ring spinning with product 
and geographical specialisation. It was embraced more enthusiastically in some districts, 
notably Rochdale, than in others, notably Oldham. Traditions of throstle spinning54 in 
the former area and the role of capital equipment suppliers and their acquisition of 
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patents, reinforced the local tendency towards specialisation in rings. Despite early patent 
registration in the USA and in Britain, it was improvements of the Sawyer and Rabbeth 
spindles from the i87os and their associated increase in productivity, that encouraged 
the replacement of throstles with rings in the Rochdale area.55 
Use of shed style constructions might also have influenced the diffusion of ring spinning 
into areas such as Rochdale where land prices were lower. The New Ladyhouse mill used 
such a style and was subsequently emulated by larger ring mills, notably Cromer (i9o6).56 
In south east Lancashire in the Oldham and Manchester areas, where land was more 
expensive,57 it is noteworthy that ring mills built in the i90os were either smaller, or 
combined with mule capacity, and availed themselves of the traditional storeyed con- 
struction. Capital ownership and the mobilisation of financial resources through local 
centres such as Oldham, where exercised through the joint stock company, supported 
larger investment in capital intensive mule companies. These offered substantial econ- 
omies of scale.58 Although such economies were present in the large Oldham mule mills 
of the i90os, the advantages were less obvious for the smaller ring mills. 
It has been argued that the structure of labour relations and the substitution of cheaper 
inputs was the basis of the survival and indeed success of the mule before 1914. According 
to this view, Lancashire's success was based on its responses in these areas to the cost 
cutting strategies of overseas companies, which were armed with the ostensibly advant- 
ageous combination of the ring spindle and cheap labour.59 Again, if the hypothesis is 
correct, vertically specialised mule mills would be expected to outperform vertically 
specialised ring mills in Lancashire. Wage cost savings in ring mills would be outweighed 
by the option of substituting cheaper raw materials in mule mills. Also, there would be 
additional reasons, associated with packaging and transport costs, to expect the superior 
performance of the latter. 
As the evidence in table i and figure i suggests, however, although labour cost was 
higher in ring mills, neither this nor constraints associated with transport and packaging 
damaged their profitability.60 In contrast to the mills of Oldham, the ring mills of Rochdale 
did not provide the allegedly technologically conservative Lancashire entrepreneur with 
capical-intensive-based competitive advantage.61 Due mainly to high labour intensity in 
|  intermediate processes, in the i89os labour cost and labour intensity was higher in 
Rochdale ring mills than their mule equivalents in Oldham.62 Superior profits demon- 
\ strated in figure i arose from greater efficiency in output per spindle and specialisation 
I  through market niches.63 If labour cost savings did exist, they were confined to the 
spinning process itself. Ring spinning required more labour in roving and other preparation 
stages and in after spinning processes, such as doffing and winding.64 Doffing was an 
unskilled task, normally assigned to teams (four per machine) of young and inexperienced 
workers, and their employment no doubt added to the labour intensity of ring spinning. 5 6
When other entrepreneurs finally began to emulate the Milnrow experiment in the early 
i90os, there was little concern with labour saving potentialities. 
Ring spinning offered a cheap capital, smaller scale alternative to the mule, but it was 
to the latter that entrepreneurs turned in the search for economies of scale. After a lag 
01 more than twenty years, the centre of the coarse spinning trade in Oldham to a very 
limited extent began to copy Rochdale from 1904 onwards. Out of 74 new mills started 
in the Oldham district between 1900 and i907,66 eight were specialist ring spinners. In 
spindleage terms they were small in relation to mule mills.67 Nonetheless, ring spinners 
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ilso became larger, and, unlike the highly specialised large new mule mills, developed 
higher count product ranges. While the counts spun by the Milnrow group had been 
18/365 range in the i88os and became 6/36s by i9i4,68 the newer companies had ave  rage
counts of 3 is, including some, such as Cromer spinning up to 64s Egyptian and Nile, 
8os Egyptian, entering the finer product range.69 As mule mills exploited economies of 
scale for ring spinners product specialisation and market niches were more important, 
although the ostensible constraint of sub-4os coarse specialisation for ring spindles was 
far less applicable in the 19005 than it had been in the i88os. 
IV 
The previous sections have examined the special characteristics of Lancashire entrepre  -
neurship and some of the reasons why entrepreneurs chose, to a limited degree only, to 
invest in ring spinning technology. Considering this evidence, it is now useful Co re- 
examine the issue of industry structure and vertical integration, in particular, the 
hypothesis that the increasing vertical specialisation of the industry became a constra nt i
on the development of high throughput, integrated manufacture.70 According to this 
argument, in the rest of the industry both branches began to resist the introduction of 
new technology because of their structure. Vertical specialisation prevented co-ordinated 
decision making between spinning and weaving mills necessary for the replacement of 
power looms with automatic looms because the spinning companies could only supply 
yarn suitable for the former.71 Thus, in Britain, only in the production of warp yams 
were specialist ring spinners able to compete, since whether rings or mules were used for 
warp, the yarn still had to be rewound from bobbins onto beams before weaving.72 If 
entrepreneurs were concerned to remove the constraints on weft yam, they could have 
either installed rings in existing integrated concerns that could also take advantage of 
developments in automatic weaving, or built brand new integrated factories. 
When investment did occur, there were many reasons why entrepreneurs preferred to 
float specialised rather than integrated concerns. First, as the trends in figure 2 illustrate, 
to specialise was more profitable during periods of boom. Specialised companies generally 
performed much better than those companies that perhaps attempted to achieve internal 
throughput economies through the adoption of vertically integrated structures. One 
company that almost uniquely followed the strategy of simultaneous investment in ring 
spinning and automatic looms was Ashton Brothers (another less prominent case was 
Fielden Bros. Ltd).73 Whilst the performance of Ashton's was average, specialised ring 
spinners enjoyed superior profitability. It may have been, however, that in times of 
depression, integration was a preferred strategy. Thus from figure 2, vertically integrated 
companies did relatively better in the i89os than in the i90os. It was also true that 
vertical integration was rewarded relative to specialisation in periods of market contrac- 
tion and penalised in periods of boom for all phases of the trade cycle to i96o.74 Given 
such variability and uncertainty, and the absence of permanent periods of advantage to 
vertically integrated companies, it is not surprising that the integration driven, throughput 
'technology based methods of Ashton's were not emulated, even during the most serious 
slumps. During the 1930-2 depression, management problems in the early days of the 
LCC were added to by the sheer scale of a business operating in an industry characterise  d
by relatively small order size and the pedagogic planning problems endemic in centrally 
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preparation and doffing, unlike the potential of the new loom, major improvements in 
ring spinning productivity were not available until after i9i4.81 Experiments with auto  -
matic weaving did not therefore necessarily lead to superior profits, despite the greatel 
efficiency of the machines.82 
Vertical integration was also resisted because entrepreneurs could enjoy its benefits 
through informal networks without the cost of creating complex organisation structu es.8^ r
An example was the contacts built by most firms with the Liverpool and Manchestel 
markets; particularly the use made by Oldham spinners of Liverpool warehouse operator  ;
as cotton stockholders.84 As noted in relation to technological diffusion earlier, linkage; 
with capital equipment manufacturers were also important. It might be added that because 
of their control by different entrepreneurial networks, these encouraged either ring 01 
automatic loom installation but not both. 
Although factor costs and productivity were important and their emphasis in recent 
debates is well justified, they do not fully explain performance differentials. Manage ent m
of integrated companies such as Horrockses and Tootals tended to find that efficient 
marketing and efficient production worked in opposite directions. Investment in wide 
product ranges limited the benefits of internal economies of scale in these companies 
but especially in the case of Horrockses, provided the basis of sustained competitive 
advantage via superior profit margins.85 Internal economies of scale were absent prio  tc r
i9i4,86 but also in subsequent periods. To the cotton economy as a whole, marketing 
was more important than manufacturing efficiency and production costs remained insig- 
nificant relative to total cost.87 
All the above reasons for specialisation were underpinned by the experience of the 
trade cycle. The British government's commitment to free trade and the gold standarc 
were capable of exercising a dominant influence on the destiny of the industry. Foi 
example, the loss and recovery of the Indian market, reflecting lobbying, British electora 
arithmetic, and the relationship between the British and Indian governments,88 had c 
decisive impact on the development of the coarse spinning American section. First 
market changes impoverished working and middle class investors and centralised capita 
ownership in the i89os. They then led to the investment boom in specialised concern; 
during the i90os backed by the new class of individualistic freelance promotional anc 
speculative capitalists referred to above. (In a parallel process, the 1920S witnessed the 
impoverishment of the promotional entrepreneurial class and its replacement by the 
creditor banks). To all sections of the industry, the world market was vital to profitability 
and variation in profitability,89 and entrepreneurs were understandably reluctant tc 
commit themselves to the high fixed costs of big firm organisation.90 Risk associated wifl- 
large variations in demand also reduced the value of internal economies of scale. 
Finally, the vast returns generated in the days of 'easy money'91 had an important 
iterative influence on investor behaviour and reinforced the tendency towards speciali- 
sation. This was particularly true of the over-investment in coarse mule spinning capacin 
during the boom of I905-7.92 Perhaps to an extent such entrepreneurial behaviour is t  c
be expected for industries whose output is cyclical around an upward secular trend, a; 
cotton was in the i90os. Confident expectation of a new and greater boom would nc 
doubt have alleviated the worries of entrepreneurs whose new mills came on stream in 
1908 just after the close of the greatest boom hitherto experienced by the industry. 
Despite justified optimism, there was a damaging legacy of overcapacity and high cost 
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base that contributed to most subsequent problems of uncompetitiveness. In this sense, 
the cause of Lancashire's decline was the pattern of capital accumulation during the 
period of growth. Furthermore, capital ownership became a constraint preventing futu e r
investment. There were five reasons for this, all of which would have been relevant in 
a counterfactual world of widespread vertical integration. First, many of the entrepreneurs 
who had made money before 1914 had divested through their personal estates by the 
early 1920S or lost their capital in the slump.93 Second, after 1920 average profit rates 
were low, risk perceptions high, and entrepreneurs therefore reluctant to reinvest. Th dly, ir
such reinvestment had always occurred through new flotation (and re-flotation in the 
case of the 1919-20 boom) rather than modernisation of existing capacity, and new 
flotation was not possible due to overcapacity. Fourthly, the overcapacity problem and 
loss of market share were iterative and compounded difficulties further. Lastly, because 
of overcapacity reinvestment had to be preceded by scrapping. This raised exit barriers 
cind the opportunity cost of new investment. Thus in some periods after 1920, entrep e- r
neurs used price fixing schemes to support marginal factories creating further market 
share losses.94 Meanwhile, serious reorganisation and re-equipment was only counten- 
anced on the basis of external intervention from the Bank of England or the government. 
The legacy of overcapacity prevented the success of these schemes. In the case of Bank 
intervention in the 1930S, reorganisation was not helped by the traditional independence 
of Lancashire from the financial institutions.95 In the case of government intervention 
in the 1950s, as suggested by one commentator in 1959, the result was an apparently 
illogical industrial policy: 'The idea of a subsidy to reduce capacity in order to be eligible 
for a subsidy to increase it, has a faint flavour of paradox to say the least.'96 Although 
the original investments had been made for the best possible reasons, Lancashire unfor- 
tunately was not living in the best of possible worlds. 
v 
There are some obvious limitations to the study presented here, for example, the absence 
of comparatives with other economies and with other periods.97 However, the current 
study has hopefully succeeded in deepening the debate and through introducing new 
evidence might promote a wider triangulation of views beyond simple economic categories 
of efficiency. Accordingly, some useful conclusions can be drawn at this stage. 
In the above discussion it has been shown that ownership and hence entrepreneurship 
were important influences on the profitability of and investment in the Lancashire textile 
industry. In turn, this had an impact on the limited diffusion of ring spinning, although 
as argued in the final section technological choice was not constrained by industry 
structure. From the perspective of the entrepreneurial failure hypothesis, it was the 
character of capital accumulation, rather than the failure of a class of individuals that 
was important. 
Ownership decisively affected growth and industry structure and Lancashire entrepre- 
neurship had several interesting features. Perhaps the most significant was the creation 
of business empires through personal shareholdings and the ability of entrepreneurs to 
manage personally relatively large numbers of similar firms. Conversely, they were eluc- r
tant to establish professional management hierarchies, which, although increasingly 
common elsewhere, were compromised in Lancashire by preference for individual, and 
48     Journal of Industrial History, 1(1) (1998) 
not corporate, accumulation. The lack of institutional capital accumulation in the 
industry was, at least in part, a function of the separate development of Lancashire, as 
an export led manufacturing sector, from the institutional and investment priorities f o
the British economy as a whole. Ownership of capital thereby became crucial to the 
development of the industry, with profitability an important determinant of its deploy- 
ment. 
In Schumpeterian terms, the issue was not simply the entrepreneurial removal of 
constraints, but the broader process of 'creative destruction'.98 On a broader level still, 
this was linked to the problem of over-investment described above. The emergent class 
of pre-1920 entrepreneurs had the purchase of new factories as their hallmark. Given 
the accumulated financial resources and flotation skills of individuals, and the expansion 
strategies of some private companies around 1900, there was nothing to stop entrepreneurs 
investing simultaneously in spinning and weaving capacity. 
Why then did these capital rich entrepreneurs not simply eliminate technical inter- 
relatedness constraints by setting up new integrated mills799 The answer might be that 
the industry's markets were growing absolutely before 1914 and that this favoured the 
entry of more vertically specialised firms.100 Thus, Lancashire was able during this period 
to optimise subject to non-problematic constraints of industrial organisation and remain 
competitive.101 However, the difficulty with this argument is that Lancashire did not 
enjoy a smooth growth trajectory before 1914. As discussed earlier, there was a sever  e
depression in the i89os, characterised by an overvalued currency, loss of market share 
and serious financial losses for businesses and individuals. Surely if a genuine constraint 
was imposed by specialisation, it was just as problematic in this period as in the years 
after 1920? Industry commentators argued, with some justification, that the conditions 
of the early i89os paralleled those of the 1920S and early 1930s.102 Extending the 
comparison further, if industry organisation was a problematic constraint in the 1920  5
and 1930s, does it also follow that it again ceases to be problematic in the periods of 
renewed growth in the late 1930S and after 1945? 
To argue that industry structure and labour relations were simultaneously a constraint 
and non-problematic 103 is a historical contradiction. Remedial action is definable by the 
hindsight blessed historian and not by the entrepreneur. If, at the time the entrepreneur 
is supposed to realise a constraint exists, the historian also defines the constraint as 
non-problematic, it is difficult to see how the entrepreneur can escape the criticisms that 
have been applied in the case of Lancashire cotton. In reality, there were no structural 
;          constraints, and even had they been problematic, the means to eliminate them were also 
present before 1914, namely the fortunes and reinvestment priorities of individual en- 
trepreneurs. In this sense, the ownership and circulation of capital, not industrial 
organisation, was the constraint, and as such was only relevant after 1920. 
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Appendix: data and sources 
COMPANY             SOURCE 
Specialisd Companies 
(i) Mule Spinners 
Crawford       'Commercial Reports', Oldham Chronicle (Saturday issues, published sum- 
maries of quarterly reports detailing profits, dividends, share and loan 
capital) April i884-December 1913. 
Dowry        Courtaulds pic Archives, Coventry, LCC/DOWI, Nominal Ledger; June 
i885-December 1912; 'Commercial Reports' Oldham Chronicle, April 
i884-December 1913. 
FCSDA       London Guildhall Library (LGL), Commercial Reports, Half Yearly 
Balance Sheets, 1899-1913 
LCC          Stock Exchange Official Intelligence, 1929-1950; Cambridge University 
Companies Database, 1950-60. 
Moorfield      'Commercial Reports', Oldham Chronicle, April 1884 - December 1913; 
Smith, 'An Oldham Limited Liability Company', pp. 34-53. 
Oshorne       Lancashire County Record Office (LCRO), DDX/869/3/i, Trade, Capi- 
tal, and Profit and Loss Accounts, June i889-June 1914. 
Sun Mill      'Commercial Reports', Oldham Chronicle, April i884-December 1913; 
Tyson, thesis, appendices i and 2. 
Werneth      Oldham Local Studies Library, Misc. 42/17 and 18, Quarterly Reports 
to Members, April i889-0ctober 1912; 'Commercial Reports', Oldham 
Chronicle, April i884-December 1888. 
(•2) Ring Spinners 
Haugh        'Commercial Reports', Oldham Chronicle, April i884-December 1913; 
Rochdale Observer, 28 June 1890 and Quarterly Reports April i892-June 
1914 inclusive. 
New Hey      'Commercial Reports', Oldham Chronicle, September i886-June 1913; 
Rochdale Observer, 28 June 1890 and April i892-June 1914. 
New Ladyhouse 'Commercial Reports', Oldham Chronicle, April i884-December 1913; 
Rochdale Observer, 28 June and April i892-June 1914. 
Vertically Integrated 
Armitage (Sir LGL, Commercial Reports, Yearly Balance Sheets, 1891-1913. 
Elkanah) 
Ashton Bros   LGL, Commercial Reports, Half Yearly Balance Sheets, 1899-1913. 
Barlow & Jones LGL, Commercial Reports, Half Yearly Balance Sheets, 1900-1913. 
Fielden        West Yorkshire Record Office (WYRO) €353/475, December 1891- 
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December 1914; 1884-1889, Law, Fieldens of Todmorden, Table XVII, 
p. 129. 
Healey Wood Rossendale Museum, BB6i4, Balance Sheets, Quarterly Trading and 
Profit and Loss Accounts and Balance Sheets, April 1907 - December 
1914; Dividends Ledger, April 1882 - December 1914. 
Horrockses     CVR, Detailed Accounts, Half Yearly Balance Sheet's and Profit and 
Loss Accounts, November 1887 - October 1905; LCRO, DDHs/53, 
Balance Sheets, Half Yearly Balance Sheets and Profit and Loss Ac- 
counts, October 1905 — April 1914. 
Rylands        LGL, Commercial Reports, Half Yearly Balance Sheets, 1884-1913; 
Farnie, 'John Rylands of Manchester', pp. 71-2. 
T & R Eccles LCRO, 868/7/1, September 1897 -September 1914. 
Tootal         Manchester Central Reference Library, M.46i, Board Minutes, Yearly 
Balance Sheets and Profit and Loss Accounts, July 1888 -July 1914. 
Whiteley      LCRO, DDX/868/2I/5, September 1898 - September 1914. 
Note: The above show the primary sources from which profit and capital series were 
constructed; aggregate data from these companies have been used to construct financial 
indices which are used throughout the text. CVR is an unlisted archive, previously held 
by Coats Viyella, recently deposited at Lancashire County Record Office (LCRO). 
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